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FAMILY LAW-DIVORCE-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARKANSAS PROP-
ERTY SETTLEMENT AND- ALIMONY STATUTES. McNew v. McNew, 262
Ark. 567, 559 S.W.2d 155 (1977).
The wife in a divorce proceeding was awarded a divorce on the
grounds of general indignities.' The husband's counterclaim was
dismissed. In accordance with Arkansas statutes, the wife was
awarded one-third of the husband's personal property absolutely
and one-third of his real property for life.'
The husband appealed both the divorce and the division of
property. He contended that his wife had failed to present evidence
corroborating her allegations of general indignities and that the
award of property was in violation of the equal protection clauses
of the Arkansas 3 and United States Constitutions.' The Arkansas
Supreme Court reversed the divorce on grounds of insufficient corro-
boration but did not rule on the constitutional issues. 5
Mr. Justice Hickman dissented and stated the divorce decree
should have been upheld based on the chancellor's finding of suffi-
cient corroboration. He would have considered the equal protection
issue and would have concluded that the Arkansas law regarding
property division in divorce actions was violative of equal protec-
tion.' His dissent questions only the constitutionality of the Arkan-
sas statutes dealing with property settlement. This note, however,
will deal with the constitutionality of statutes granting property
settlements as well as alimony to females while denying the same
benefit to males.
A minority of jurisdictions, including Arkansas,' makes prop-
erty and alimony awards only to the wife and bases the holdings and
statutes on the old common law which recognized a husband's duty
to support his wife but not a reciprocal duty of the wife to support
1. McNew v. McNew, 262 Ark. 567, 569, 559 S.W.2d 155, 156 (1977). See ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 34-1202 (1962).
2. McNew v. McNew, 262 Ark. 567, 569, 559 S.W.2d 155, 156 (1977).
3. Id. at 572, 559 S.W.2d at 158. ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 3.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. McNew v. McNew, 262 Ark. 567, 572, 559 S.W.2d 155,158. In Arkansas corroboration
is required in contested cases. Although only slight corroboration is required, Mrs. McNew
failed to meet that burden. See the Family Law section of the Second Annual Survey of Ark.
Law, 2 UALR L.J. 236 (1979) for a more detailed discussion of corroboration.
6. McNew v. McNew, 262 Ark. 567, 573, 559 S.W.2d 155, 158 (1977) (Hickman, J.,
dissenting).
7. Id. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 infra note 73.
8. Kurtz, The State Equal Rights Amendments and Their Impacts on Domestic Rela-
tions Law, XI FAM. L.Q. 101, 131 n.103 (1977).
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her husband.' Because the church was the foundation from which a
marriage began, it seemed quite natural for the dissolution of a
marriage to come under the early jurisdiction of the English eccle-
siastical courts. 10 Divorce, as an absolute termination of a marriage,
was at first allowed only on a limited basis by English law. Prior to
1857, three methods existed for the modification of a marriage. " The
least common method, and the only method which resembled an
absolute termination, was that which was granted by Parliament.'
It was generally available only to the aristocracy, and it was a com-
mon practice for the Parliament to insist upon a provision for the
support of the wife before granting the divorce. A vinculo
matrimonii, '1 a decree similar to the present-day annulment, was
granted by the ecclesiastical courts although no property settlement
or payment to the wife could be granted." A decree a mensa et
thoro,'0 also awarded by the ecclesiastical courts, resembled
present-day separation. Grounds for this type of divorce were simi-
lar to the fault grounds available in many modern American juris-
dictions. 7 Under a mensa et thoro, the courts would allow the wife
to receive income from the husband as alimony. 8 This award was
based on the traditional duty of the husband to support his wife,
which continued after judicial separation. 19
Awards of support to the wife under the a mensa type divorce
were logical in relation to the role that women played in English
society during this period. A woman's legal identity became one
with her husband's, and she looked to him for support. 0 If this
support were terminated, the wife could become a burden to society.
Because the a mensa type of divorce was basically a separation, the
husband's duty to provide this support was not terminated. The
wife's dependency on her husband actually increased because of the
view of property ownership during this period. Virtually all of the
9. H. CLARtK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 14.6 (1968).
10. Holt, Support v. Alimony in Virginia: It's Time to Use the Revised Statutes, 12 U.
OF RICH. L. REV. 139, 139 (1977).
11. Kurtz, supra note 8, at 129.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 130.
14. A vinculo matrimonii means from the bond of matrimony. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
7 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
15. Kurtz, supra note 8, at 129.
16. A mensa et thoro means from bed and board. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 6 (4th rev.
ed. 1968).
17. Kurtz, supra note 8, at 129.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 130.
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property of the wife came under the control of her husband at mar-
riage.2
Statutes enacted after 1857 increased the availability of the
absolute divorce,2" and the argument that a husband continued to
have a duty to support his wife after a complete termination of the
marriage lost some of its credibility. The established ecclesiastical
practice, however, seems to have made its way into American law.2;
The difficulty in justifying the imposition on the husband of a con-
tinuing duty of support in an absolute divorce was "not obviated by
labeling alimony a 'substitute' for a wife's right to support. Why
should there be such a substitute? '2 4
The traditional view of women, upon which common law di-
vorce statutes were based, is changing. Women have gained full
legal capacity to own and control their property. 5 The United States
Supreme Court in Taylor v. Louisiana"6 took judicial notice of the
changing position of women in society. In Taylor the Court consid-
ered certain statistics of the Department of Labor which revealed
that in 1974, 54.2% of all women between eighteen and sixty-four
years of age were in the labor force."
In several recent cases of alleged sex discrimination, the Court
has supported the proposition that women are the legal equal of
men. In Reed v. Reeds the Court struck down an Idaho statute
giving males priority over women as administrators of estates.2" It
was decided that the classification must be reasonable, not arbi-
trary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a "fair
and substantial relation" to the object of the legislation." Although
the Court did not find that sex-based classifications were "suspect
classifications" that require "strict scrutiny," it is obvious that it
did apply a more stringent test than the traditional "rational rela-
21. Holt, supra note 10, at 139.
22. Kurtz, supra note 8, at 129 n.95.
23. H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIc RELATIONS § 14.1 (1968).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
27. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 535 n.17 (1975). Compare with the view of women
in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873) in which the Court stated that "the
paramount destiny and mission of women are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife
and mother. This is the law of the creator. . . . The natural and proper timidity and delicacy
which belong to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life."
Id. at 141.
28. 404 U.S. 771 (1971).
29. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). The Court found the statute discriminatory
even though the legislative purpose had some legitimacy.
30. Id.
19791
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tion" test.' The latter test would seek only a reasonable or rational
relationship to the accomplishment of a valid state purpose. Such
a relationship can be found when the classification only indirectly
affects the state purpose. 2
In Frontiero v. Richardson33 a female member of the uniformed
services successfully challenged a federal statute under which a
serviceman could automatically claim that his wife was dependent
upon him for support in order to receive additional pay allowances.
A servicewoman, however, had to prove the dependence of her hus-
band before she could receive the same benefits. Four justices held
that statutory classifications based on sex were "inherently sus-
pect. ' 3 Citing the earlier Reed decision, Mr. Justice Brennan indi-
cated that the Court had departed from the "traditional" rational-
basis analysis with respect to sex-based classifications .3 His plural-
ity opinion adopted a view that this country had a long history of
sex discrimination rationalized by "an attitude of 'romantic pater-
nalism' which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but
in a cage. '36 Sex, like race and national origin, was considered by
the Court to be a characteristic determined solely by birth and
usually had no relevance to ability to perform or contribute to so-
ciety.37 The Court concluded that "classifications based upon sex,
like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are
inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial
scrutiny."8
Since the decision in Frontiero, the United States Supreme
Court has declined to apply the strict scrutiny test to sex classifica-
tions and has instead applied the "heightened rationality" test of
Reed.39 Two years after Frontiero, Mr. Justice Brennan again deliv-
31. Note, Kahn v. Shevin and the "Heightened Rationality Test": Is the Supreme
Court Promoting a Double Standard in Sex Discrimination Cases?, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
275, 280 (1975). A test requiring a "substantial" relation between classification and purpose
of the statute applies a higher standard than does a test requiring that a legitimate rational
state interest be served. See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) for a discussion of the
test used in Reed.
32. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948) for the application of the
"traditional" test.
33. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
34. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
35. Id. at 684.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 686.
38. Id. at 688.
39. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975);
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Geduldig v. Aliello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). The
Court in the preceding cases failed to view gender-based classifications as suspect.
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ered the opinion of the Court and sustained a sex discrimination
claim on equal protection grounds in Weinberger v. Wiesenfield.1O
The Court found that a gender-based distinction allowing social
security survivor benefits to widows but not widowers was indistin-
guishable from the classification invalidated in Frontiero. The clas-
sification in Weinberger was considered to be based on "archaic and
overbroad" generalizations that male earnings are vital to the sup-
port of their families while female earnings do not add significantly
to their families' support." The Court stated that "such a gender-
based generalization cannot suffice to justify the denigration of the
efforts of women who do work and whose earnings contribute signifi-
cantly to their families' support."4 The Court, however, did not
invoke strict scrutiny but instead utilized the Reed "fair and sub-
stantial" standard to refute the government's argument that there
was a need to offset the adverse economic situtation of women only.
The provision was held to be unconstitutional.4 3
In Kahn v. Shevin" the Court again relied on the "fair and
substantial relation" standard of Reed in upholding the constitu-
tionality of a Florida statute which allowed an annual tax exemp-
tion to widows but not widowers. 4" Florida's interest in reducing the
disparity between the economic capabilities of a man and a woman
was found to have a "fair and substantial relation" to the object of
the legislation.4 The Court based its holding on the job market
being "inhospitable to the woman seeking any but the lowest paid
jobs." It cited 1972 statistics which indicated that full-time working
women earn a median income only 57.9% of the median for males. 7
The Court reasoned that while the widower can continue in his
occupation, the widow is forced into a job market with which she is
unfamiliar, and, because of her former economic dependency, she
has fewer skills to offer.4
A majority of the states have recognized the changing status of
women and developed divorce statutes which allow alimony awards
to either spouse." Three states" have adopted versions of section 308
40. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
41. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643 (1975).
42. Id. at 645.
43. Id. at 653.
44. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
45. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 352 (1974).
46. Id. at 356.
47. Id. at 353.
48. Id. at 354.
49. Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illi-
nois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri,
1979]
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of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act.5 This section enumerates
specific circumstances under which the court may order a mainte-
nance award to either spouse.
Several jurisdictions have recently been faced with a question
similar to the one the Arkansas Supreme Court would have faced
in McNew had it granted the plaintiff her divorce. A review of cases
from some of these jurisdictions is helpful in understanding the
recent judicial reasoning on this subject. In Stern v. Stern2 a hus-
band appealed an award of temporary alimony and challenged the
constitutionality of a Connecticut statute which would not require
a female in his same situation to pay temporary alimony. The Con-
necticut Supreme Court utilized the "fair and substantial relation"
test of Reed to sustain the classification as reasonably related to the
state's interest in making judgments about family life and family
relationships.13 The court thereby retained the common law view of
the husband's duty to support.54
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Virgin Islands, Washing-
ton, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
50. Colorado, Kentucky, and Missouri. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-101-103 (1973);
Ky. REV. STAT. § 403.200 (1973); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.335 (Vernon 1975).
51. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACr (U.L.A.) § 308 provides as follows:
[Maintenance] (a) In a proceeding for dissolution of a marriage or legal separation,
or a proceeding for maintenance following dissolution of the marriage by a court
which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse, the court may grant a
maintenance order for either spouse only if it finds that the spouse seeking mainte-
nance:
(1) lacks sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to him, to
provide for his reasonable needs, and
(2) is unable to support himself through appropriate employment or is the cus-
todian of a child whose condition or circumstances make it appropriate that the
custodian not be required to seek employment outside the home.
(b) The maintenance order shall be in such amounts and for such periods of
time as the court deems just, without regard to marital misconduct, and after
considering all relevant factors including:
(1) the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including marital
property apportioned to him, and his ability to meet his needs independently,
including the extent to which a provision for support of a child living with the party
includes a sum for that party as custodian; (2) the time necessary to acquire suffi-
cient education or training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find appro-
priate employment; (3) the standard of living established during the marriage; (4)
the duration of the marriage; (5) the age, and the physical and emotional condition
of the spouse seeking maintenance; and (6) the ability of the spouse from whom
maintenance is sought to meet his needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking
maintenance.
52. 165 Conn. 190, 332 A.2d 78 (1973).
53. Id. at 193, 332 A.2d at 83.
54. Id. at 198, 332 A.2d at 82.
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The Pennsylvania courts have also considered the constitution-
ality of their statute dealing with interspousal support. In Lukens
v. Lukens55 the court upheld the statutory treatment of men and
women and stated that the statute was broad enough that a hus-
band in need could seek support from his wife if she had financial
ability to provide it. One year later the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court declared the alimony pendente lite statutes, which made
awards only to females, unconstitutional in light of the state ratifi-
cation of the Equal Rights Amendment."
Although the Georgia Supreme Court had previously held the
Georgia alimony statutes to be constitutional, the appellee husband
in Murphy v. Murphy" sought reconsideration of the issue in light
of the subsequent United States Supreme Court decisions of Reed
and Frontiero. The Georgia court relied on the Kahn decision for
support in finding the Georgia statutes constitutional.51 The reason-
ing in Kahn that noted the "economic disparity" of a woman thrown
into the job market after the death of her spouse was applied to a
dependent wife involved in the demise of a marriage.5 The United
States Supreme Court declined to determine the constitutionality
of denying alimony to males when it refused to grant certiorari in
Murphy. 60
The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
a statute authorizing an award of alimony pendente lite only to the
wife.6' The court found support for its decision in the fact that the
wife had little control over her property because the civil code made
the husband "head and master" over the community property. As
a result, it was reasonable for the legislature to seek to provide
protection for the wife during the dissolution of the community
existence. 2 Utilizing the rationale of Kahn and citing Murphy, the
Louisiana Supreme Court found its statute dealing with permanent
55. Lukens v. Lukens, 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 227, 303 A.2d 522 (1973).
56. Henderson v. Henderson, 458 Pa. 97, 327 A.2d 60 (1974). The decision in Henderson
had little practical effect, however, because the legislature had already amended the statute
extending the right of alimony pendente lite to both males and females. Beck, Equal Rights
Amendment: The Pennsylvania Experience, 81 DICK. L. REv. 395, 408 n.81 (1977). See PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 46 (Purdon Supp. 1976). The legislature, however, took no action to
restructure the "divorce from bed and board" statute. Beck, supra, at 408.
57. 232 Ga. 352, 206 S.E.2d 458 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929 (1975).
58. Id. at 354, 206 S.E.2d at 459.
59. Id.
60. 421 U.S. 929 (1975). But see an Alabama case, Orr v. Orr, 351 So. 2d. 906 (Ala. 1977)
which is currently on appeal to the United States Supreme Court, docket No. 77-1119.
61. Williams v. Williams, 331 So. 2d 438 (La. 1976).
62. Id. at 441.
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alimony constitutional. The court exercised some rather liberal ju-
dicial reasoning, however, and determined that males were also eli-
gible for alimony under the current statutes. 3
Prior to Florida's enactment of a no-fault divorce law in 1971,
its statutes dealing with divorce were based on the English common
law. 4 Florida's judicial decisions since that time have recognized
the changing role of women in society. 5 A Florida district court
recently recognized the right of a husband to obtain an award of
alimony and attorney's fees from his wife.8 6
In Thaler v. Thalere7 the New York Superior Court found that
statutes allowing the awarding of alimony and attorney's fees exclu-
sively to the wife were unconstitutional as a violation of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The court relied on
Frontiero to consider sex classifications "suspect" and found that
the New York statutes were unable to survive strict judicial scru-
63. Whitt v. Vauthier, 316 So. 2d 202 (La. Ct. App.) aff'd. mem. 320 So. 2d 558 (La.),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1975). The Code Napoleon of 1804, upon which Louisiana statutes
are based, provided for alimony to either spouse. The "wife-only" alimony provision did not
appear until 1808. The court, therefore, determined that the 1808 code only repealed incon-
sistent laws and since this provision was not inconsistent, the 1804 provision was still in effect
and males were eligible for alimony. Id. at 205.
64. Pacheco v. Pacheco, 246 So. 2d 778, 780-81 (Fla.), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 804
(1971).
65. See, e.g., Beard v. Beard, 262 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1971). The court stated "[in this
era of women's liberation movements and enlightened thinking we have almost universally
come to appreciate the fallacy of treating the feminine members of our society on anything
but a basis of complete equality with the opposite sex. Any contrary view would be completely
anachronistic." Id. at 271-72.
66. Lefler v. Lefler, 264 So. 2d 112 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) wherein the court stated
the following:
For the first time ever . the husband to the marriage could seek and obtain an
award of alimony and suit money from the wife. . . . [Tihis represents a radical
departure from the historical concept of alimony as an award based on the common
law obligation of the husband to support his wife, . . . [but] it nonetheless is in
keeping with the present trend toward assuring complete equality between the
sexes.
Id. at 113. An award of $30,000 lump sum alimony and 18 months of $5000 per month
rehabilitative alimony to the husband was upheld in a Florida District Court based on the
wife's financial condition and the husband's need. Pfohl v. Pfohl, 345 So. 2d 371 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1977). The wife contributed the majority of support from her family wealth. The
husband was not well educated and not capable of post-divorce employment which would
support him in the style to which he had been accustomed.
67. 89 Misc. 2d 315, 391 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Sup. Ct.) rev'd on other grounds, 396 N.Y.S.2d
815 (App. Div. 1977). The husband was a nonimmigrant alien, unable to legally work in this
country and dependent on his wife's income for support. In a very short opinion, however,
the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court reversed the order on the law stating
"alimony should not have been granted to the defendant upon the showing made at Special
Term" and thus the court did not consider the constitutional questions.
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tiny.6" The court reasoned that alimony was a support notion within
the principle of Weinberger, which had involved a social security
provision, rather than a tax exemption as in Kahn."5 In Kahn the
United States Supreme Court was considering an estate tax exemp-
tion and found that administrative convenience in determining eli-
gibility might be a "rational" state objective. But in divorce cases,
the New York Superior Court stated each situation is considered
individually; therefore, ease of administration does not apply. 0 The
fact that impact of spousal loss generally falls more heavily on
women than men has no bearing in divorce cases. Each case will be
considered individually, and the financial conditions of both parties
will be taken into account." The court in Thaler was not attempting
to deny a needy wife this benefit but to make it equally available
to a needy husband."
Arkansas statutes concerning alimony and property settlement
authorize such awards only to females. 3 The Arkansas statutes are
68. Thaler v. Thaler, 89 Misc. 2d 315, 319, 391 N.Y.S.2d 331, 336 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
69. Id. at 321, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 339.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1210 (1962) provides in part that "[diuring the pendency of
an action for divorce or alimony, the court may allow the wife maintenance and a reasonable
fee or her attorneys .... " (emphasis added). ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1211 (1962) provides in
part that "[wihen a decree shall be entered, the court shall make such order touching the
alimony of the wife and care of the children, if there be any, as from the circumstances of
the parties and the nature of the case shall be reasonable." (emphasis added). ARK. STAT.
ANN. 34-1213 (1962) provides the following:
The court, upon application of either party, may make such alterations from time
to time, as to the allowance of alimony and maintenance, as may be proper, (and
may order any reasonable sum to be paid for the support of the wife, during the
pending of her bill for a divorce).
(emphasis added). ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 (1962) provides in part,
In every final judgment for divorce from the bonds of matrimony granted to the
husband, an order shall be made that each party be restored to all property not
disposed of at the commencement of the action, which either party obtained from
or through the other during the marriage and in consideration or by reason thereof;
and where the divorce is granted to the wife the court shall make an order that each
party be restored to all property not disposed of at the commencement of the action,
which either party obtained from or through the other during the marriage and in
consideration or by reason thereof; and the wife so granted a divorce against the
husband, if she shall have actually personally resided in this State for a period of
time next before the commencement of the action at least equal to the residence
required to enable her to maintain an action for divorce, shall be entitled to one-
third (1/3) of the husband's personal property absolutely, and one-third (1/3) of all
the lands whereof her husband was seized of an estate of inheritance at any time
during the marriage for her life, unless the same shall have been relinquished by
her in legal form, and every such final order or judgment shall designate the specific
property both real and personal, to which such wife is entitled ....
(emphasis added).
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founded on the traditional common law view of the husband's duty
to support.7 Alimony in Arkansas is the allowance which a husband,
by order of the court, pays to his wife, being separated from him,
for her maintenance. 7 Alimony has also been described as a con-
tinuing allotment of sums payable at regular intervals for the wife's
support .7 The fact that a wife has more income than her husband
does not preclude an award of alimony. That fact, however, will be
considered by the court in making an award.77 The Arkansas Su-
preme Court has recognized that in matters of child support, statu-
tory interpretation allows contribution by either spouse, and the
court will consider the condition and means of each spouse. 7 The
Arkansas Supreme Court has not considered an equal protection
claim grounded on a gender-based distinction. 71
Ruth McNew had accumulated over $100,000.00 in property
during her marriage, and Mr. Justice Hickman considered the chan-
cellor's inability under Arkansas law to award any of the property
to the husband an "obvious inequity and discrimination."80 Mr.
Justice Hickman stated that "[tihe Arkansas law regarding prop-
erty was enacted before the turn of the century and can no longer
be defended historically or legally with any confidence. It clearly
violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the Arkansas8' and United
States Constitutions."82
74. See generally Bowman v. Worthington, 24 Ark. 522, 533 (1867) for a good discussion
of the traditional view of alimony in Arkansas.
75. Id.
76. Erwin v. Erwin, 179 Ark. 192, 193, 14 S.W.2d 1100, 1100 (1929).
77. White v. White, 228 Ark. 732, 310 S.W.2d 216 (1958).
78. Barnhard v. Barnhard, 252 Ark. 167, 477 S.W.2d 845 (1972).
79. The court, however, did consider an equal protection question in Boshears v. Ark.
Racing Comm'n 258 Ark. 741, 528 S.W.2d 646 (1975). This case involved the distinction
between a state and a private employee's right to appeal a worker's compensation claim.
Considering the statute under traditional equal protection standards, the court found it
constitutional. Id. at 747, 528 S.W.2d at 650. The appellant's contention that state employees
were, as a group, a "suspect class" was found to be without merit. Id. The court cited several
Supreme Court cases, including Frontiero, which would have supported the appellant's con-
tention had membership of the class been based on an accident of birth such as sex or
alienage. Id.
80. McNew v. McNew, 262 Ark. 567, 559 S.W.2d 155, 159 (1977) (Hickman, J., dissent-
ing).
81. Id. (citing ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 3.) That pertinent part of the Arkansas Constitution
states that "[tihe equality of all persons before the law is recognized, and shall ever remain
inviolate."
82. McNew v. McNew, 262 Ark. 567, 573, 559 S.W.2d 155, 159 (1977) (Hickman, J.,
dissenting) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1). That portion of the U.S. Constitution states
that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
[Vol. 2
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Mr. Justice Hickman did not believe that the Arkansas statutes
which permit alimony, child support, and attorney's fees only to the
wife were unconstitutional because their application is always based
on individual cases and situations.8 He justified such disparate
treatment by finding a historical need for the law since "[slome
women foresake education to become full-time homemakers. Ali-
mony permits a court to correct any financial inequities because of
the party's circumstances."84 He characterized the divorce laws in
Arkansas as generally "archaic" and in need of revision by the legis-
lature.8
In light of recent decisions and changes in the treatment of
women before the courts, consideration by the Arkansas court of the
constitutional issue in the McNew case should lead to a finding that
the Arkansas divorce statutes dealing with property settlement, as
well as alimony, are in violation of equal protection and thus uncon-
stitutional.
The real question, however, is whether the traditional legal
view of women is still valid since they have assumed a more promi-
nent place in society. To make up for "economic inequities" the
Arkansas courts have always had the discretion to award a needy
wife support of property depending on her circumstances. It appears
that the same discretion should be allowed in meeting a husband's
needs since the court has to consider each case individually. The
court would not be denying a benefit to women but only making it
equally available to men."8 Although such disparate treatment has
been justified by a "benign purpose" to overcome the disadvantages
a divorced female might face in the job market, these disadvantages
may no longer exist. The court should make such a determination
based on the particular facts presented. A mere recitation of a be-
nign purpose should not be enough to protect against a further
inquiry into the actual purpose of the classification.87
It appears that the reasoning of Weinberger which involved a
support statute (social security) is more applicable to divorce and
maintenance actions than the reasoning in Kahn which allowed a
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."
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tax exemption to widows only. In Weinberger the Supreme Court
found the distinction between the wife and the husband to be irra-
tional in relation to which party might require support even though
the Court recognized that men are more likely to be the primary
family supporters.u
McNew is important because it brings to light a question which
the Arkansas Supreme Court will face in the future. In view of
recent trends in other jurisdictions it would appear that Mr. Justice
Hickman's statement is correct-divorce laws in Arkansas are
archaic and in need of revision by the legislature."9 The legislature
should revise these statutes and adopt provisions similar to those of
the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. 0 Because such a revision
may require strong impetus, it is likely that the Arkansas Supreme
Court will have to decide these issues before the legislature acts.
The McNew dissent signals that at least one member of the court
is willing to address that issue, and attorneys in divorce appeals
should heed this strong invitation to argue a constitutional
issue-equal protection.
[Note by Gordon W. Hawthorne]
88. Id. at 651.
89. McNew v. McNew, 262 Ark. 567, 574, 559 S.W.2d 155, 159 (1977) (Hickman, J.,
dissenting).
90. See Newbern & Johnson, The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act: Analysis for
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